What psychiatric genetics has taught us about the nature of psychiatric illness and what is left to learn
1. Family, twin and adoption studies (hereafter, FTA) have found that all psychiatric disorders aggregate in families and are heritable These results are unsurprising. Finding human traits or disorders for which close relatives are uncorrelated and which are not heritable is difficult. 1 These findings teach us five lessons. First, things that relatives share are important for the etiology of psychiatric illness. Second, the radical environmentalist agenda for psychiatric illness is misguided. Genes in aggregate have important roles in the etiology of psychiatric disorders. Third, we are doing something right in FTA research as the degree of replication is usually good, probably because the effects are large. [2] [3] [4] [5] Fourth, because genetic effects must be expressed through biological processes, these findings suggest that psychiatric disorders are 'biological.' Finally, these findings justify efforts to localize molecular genetic variants etiologic for psychiatric illness. 6 These achievements are balanced by three significant limitations to FTA methodology. First, classical FTA studies are correlational and provide no insight into underlying mechanisms. Demonstrating familial environmental effects does not clarify the degree to which they arise from parental behavior, diet, peer group influences or toxin exposure. Showing heritability gives no insight into the molecular genetic mechanisms involved.
We should not feel too concerned about this. Many critical medical findings began as correlations with unknown underlying mechanisms, such as the associations between prior cow-pox infections and reduction in small pox risk, 7 drinking fouled water and getting cholera, 8 and cigarette smoking and lung cancer. 9 Medical science often starts with correlations and the underlying mechanisms are subsequently clarified through scientific advances. Second, the claim that FTA studies 'prove' that a disorder is 'biological' is weak. An astonishingly wide array of human behaviors and traits, such as hours spent watching television, 10 sports participation, 11 church attendance, 12 doing crossword puzzles, 13 age at first sexual intercourse 14 and liking roller coasters, 13 are heritable. Turkheimer 1 has suggested a first law of behavior genetics: 'All human behavioral traits are heritable'.
Knowing how much variation exists in the human genome, and how intimately genetic factors are involved in the development of the human brain, is it plausible that a human behavioral trait is unrelated to genetic endowment? If the brain wired itself at random with no reference to genomic instructions, this might be defensible. But that is not how brains are made.
So if all behavior is instantiated in the brain, which is constructed in part from a genetic program, then all behaviors will have some genetic influence. But nothing new is learned by claiming that a twin study showing that disorder X is heritable now proves that it is 'biological.' The weakness of the FTA claim can be clarified by contrasting it with how our science has progressed with Mendelian disorders. Like FTA studies, initial investigations of Mendelian disorders start with a statistical concept such as a LOD score. However, they are now soon able to learn the specific gene involved and the nature of the crippling mutations. This is 'strong' biology that can lead to etiological and therapeutic insights.
Individual psychiatric disorders are clinical-historical constructs not pathophysiological entities. The historical traditions on which we rely, although full of clinical wisdom, give no guarantee about biological coherence-that underlying the clinical syndrome is a single definable pathophysiology. The third important limitation of FTA studies is that they provide no assurances about neurobiological coherence. Let us define a new disorder called LLR with three criteria: (i) left handedness, (ii) long nose and (iii) red hair. Because handedness, nose size and hair color are all independently influenced by genes, we would find that the LLR syndrome is familial and heritable. We can then claim that LLR is 'biological.' However, LLR is not a coherent category and will have no comprehensible unifying underlying biology.
2. Advanced genetic epidemiological methods allowed us to ask important questions about the etiology of psychiatric disorders.
The field of FTA studies of psychiatric illness has remained dynamic, moving from studying static heritabilities [15] [16] [17] to exploring the etiology of comorbidities, documenting developmental changes in genetic and environmental influences, showing how genes influence selection into high-risk environments, and providing increasing insights into how genes and environmental risk factors work together to produce individuals at high or low risk to illness. These advances have contributed substantially to our understanding of etiological process in psychiatric illness and have not required elucidation of the biological pathways through which risk genes operate. That genes impact on risk for MD by influencing personality 18 and on risk for alcoholism through selection of deviant peers 19 represents important lessons even if we know nothing about the specific genes involved.
3a. The first generation of molecular genetic studies of psychiatric illness-linkage studies-were largely unsuccessful at producing replicable findings. 3b. Candidate gene association studies taught us two important lessons. First, if we do not properly control for multiple testing with low prior probabilities, we can expect high rates of false positive findings. Second, we knew next to nothing about the biological mechanisms underlying psychiatric illness.
By the mid-1980s, FTA studies provided consistent evidence for aggregate genetic effects for an increasing number of psychiatric disorders. However, we knew nothing about how that risk was distributed across the genome. While the patterns from FTA studies were inconsistent with Mendelian transmission, a substantial proportion of the genetic signal could have been concentrated in a few large-effect genes. This hypothesis was tested by linkage studies. With a few possible exceptions (for example, Prescott et al., 20 Lewis et al. 21 and St Clair et al. 22 ), other findings ruled out this possibility.
Risk genes for psychiatric disorders could reside in the neurotransmitter systems that served as the chief foci for the early biological theories of the etiology of psychiatric disordersfor example, dopamine for schizophrenia, 23 serotonin and norepinephrine for depression. 24, 25 Although still controversial, with perhaps a few exceptions, this hope was also not realized. These developments could be seen as nature giving the field of psychiatric genetics two hard lessons.
4a. Early genome-wide association studies (GWAS) of psychiatric illness were not successful at detecting replicable findings. However, as the sample sizes began to increase, replicable findings began to emerge.
4b. Large deletions and duplications (aka copy number variants (CNVs)) were beginning to be found and replicated that substantially increased risk for psychiatric disorders, especially schizophrenia and autism. [25] [26] [27] 4c. Two statistical methods were developed that assessed the aggregate impact of variants 'tagged' by the common singlenucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) on GWA arrays.
The appeal of GWAS is its brute force nature-testing one-byone, with no prioritization, hundreds of thousands of common variants. It is conceptually the opposite of candidate gene studies that utilize pathophysiological theories to test a small number of variants. GWAS assumes ignorance about etiology and treats every common genomic variant the same. This allows the detection of pathogenic variants never previously conceived of. The penalty is its low power, due to the multiple testing burden. For psychiatry, this bargain is beginning to pay off.
The earliest GWAS of psychiatric illness were under-powered. Our 'hard lessons' continued, as our findings whittled away the plausible parameter space wherein we might find variants impacting on risk. [28] [29] [30] One set of dramatic reproducible findings emerged for smoking. 31 In the past 2 years, replicable signals have begun to emerge from the GWAS of some major psychiatric disorders. In the first major report from the Psychiatric GWAS Consortium (PGC) Schizophrenia group, 32 81 of the most significant SNPs from the primary sample (9394 cases and 12 462 controls) were typed in a large replicate sample (8442 cases 29 839 controls). The P-value distribution of these SNPs in the replicate sample was unlikely to occur by chance (Po10 À 15 ), indicating that the original findings were largely true positive results.
Similar findings emerged from the PGC bipolar group. 33 Two genome-wide significant findings emerged and replication of the 34 most significant SNPs in a large independent sample produced results that were very unlikely to have arisen by chance (Po4 Â 10
). Two statistical methods have been developed to assess aggregate effects of DNA variation tagged by GWAS. These methods can be best understood as molecular extensions of FTA methodology. Instead of looking at informative relationships (for example, monozygotic twins), they look at the aggregate effects of genome-wide DNA variation. While FTA studies assess all genomic variation, these methods only utilize the proportion of variation 'tagged' by the available genotypes. But FTA methods struggle to separate genetic from environmental influences on resemblance. These newer methods have no such problem.
The first of these methods 34 takes statistically independent variants from a training case-control GWAS (NB75 000) and ranks them from the smallest to the largest P-value. Each variant is then weighted by the degree to which it differentiates cases from controls. That information is then applied to a second target sample where a risk allele at each location would be given a positive and the protective allele a negative score. The method was first applied to schizophrenia, generating a polygene score algorithm from the International Schizophrenia Consortium sample and applying it to the Molecular Genetics of Schizophrenia study. 34 When 50% of all the independent variants were used in the polygene score, the cases from the MGS sample had a higher score than the controls at a striking significance level: P ¼ 2 Â 10 À 28 . Amidst these thousands of variants, a substantial number of true positive findings must be providing this predictive power. The polygene method has been used with similar results from other samples with schizophrenia, 32 with bipolar illness 33, 35 and between the two disorders. 34, 36 The second method uses a conceptual framework analogous to FTA studies. Genome-wide complex trait analysis (GCTA) 37 uses the common genetic variants from GWAS to assess the degree of remote genetic relationship between individuals. It then calculates heritability on the basis of how closely these calculated genetic relationships map onto phenotypic resemblance. These heritabilities again reflect lower bound estimates because they capture only the genetic relationships associated with the common SNPs, whereas FTA methods capture the genetic relationships based on the full frequency spectrum of causal variants. Using this method, the following levels of 'SNPheritability' from a range of samples have been reported: Schizophrenia, 23%; 38 42 and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, 28%.
39
Results from these two approaches have three important implications. First, they give insight into the genetic architecture of psychiatric disorders, suggesting that a substantial proportion of genetic variation results from large numbers of small effect variants. Second, as noted by Turkheimer, 43 they bring closure to the long debate about the validity of prior evidence for genetic influences on risks for psychiatric disorders. For years, critics have claimed that twin studies of psychiatric illness are uninterpretable because excess resemblance of MZ vs DZ twins could arise from environmental sources, and adoption studies were deeply flawed because adoption agencies do not place children into adoptive families at random. 44, 45 Now that we have methods to determine heritability that rely on entirely different assumptions, the plausibility of these objections, already frequently addressed (for example, Kendler and Prescott 17 and Kendler 46 ) are further eroded. Third, FTA methods are cumbersome and rely on rare relationships to infer genetic risk. We now have the tools to assess genetic variants directly in individuals and from that data calculate aggregate risk.
However, like FTA studies, the demonstration of genetic variance from these two methods yields no insight into biology. 43 Like FTA studies, they only tell us that, somewhere on the genome, variants exist, which impact on disease risk. These methods also provide no better assurance about diagnostic coherence than FTA studies. Our LLR syndrome would have demonstrable heritability by these methods.
INSIGHTS INTO THE ETIOLOGY OF PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS FROM GWAS FINDINGS
Sample sizes for GWAS, particularly those achieved through the PGC, 47 are increasing. Both statistical logic and evidence for other complex disorders predict that we will soon have for several major psychiatric disorders 6 dozens of genome-wide significant common variants. The first clear sign of this trend is in results recently presented from the second phase of the PGC schizophrenia analyses where, with 25 785 cases and 28 441 controls, 62 genome-wide significant sites containing schizophrenia risk variants were found (Stephan Ripke for Psychiatric Genetics Consortium Schizophrenia (PGCSCZ), oral presentation 20th World Congress of Psychiatric Genetics, October 14-18 2012, Hamburg, Germany).
Pathogenic CNVs reflect major genomic events and are harder to detect and more complex biologically than SNP variants. Individually, they are rare and often associated with a spectrum of neurodevelopmental anomalies. Their causal relationship with at least schizophrenia and autism is now well established. 6, 48 Furthermore, sequencing studies are rapidly increasing in sample size, and it is likely 49 but not certain, 50 that verified rare risk variants will emerge from these methods. (For example, in both inflammatory bowel and cardiovascular disease, a proportion of genes that contain common risk variants of small effect also contain rare variants of larger effect). 51, 52 In aggregate, the advances in these methods coupled with new methods of gene network analyses may soon present the field of psychiatry with a moment of truth. We will be able to peel back our layers of ignorance and get our first look at the architecture of variants in the human genome that impact on risk for the historicalclinical syndromes around which we have organized our discipline.
After failed efforts to uncover a consistent set of neuropathological changes associated with major psychiatric disorders in the latter half of the 19th century, 53 the next influential effort to develop biological theories for psychiatric illnesses, beginning in the 1960s, were based on the recently discovered catecholamine and indoleamine neurotransmitter systems. 23 Repeated attempts have been made to verify these theories including studying candidate genes in the synthetic, degradative or receptor components of these systems. When directly tested, the empirical track records of these theories have, in general, been poor. 23 Both of these methods were 'top-down,' seeking to go from neuropathological or neurochemical findings to etiology. We now see early fruits of a 'bottom-up' approach to clarifying the etiology of psychiatric disorders beginning with DNA variants.
Many factors will influence the pattern of results that will emerge. Two are likely to be particularly important: the degree of etiological heterogeneity and the biological level at which the disorders predominantly arises. 54 Heterogeneity is the more straightforward. At one extreme, there may be dozens of biologically distinct pathways to illness with little or no sharing between them. At the other extreme-etiologic homogeneityjust one pathway to illness awaits discovery.
By level of illness, I mean where the 'causal action' predominantly occurs that leads to disease 54, 55 (I have previously argued that multiple levels of etiological factors typically contribute to psychiatric disorders. 56, 57 In this essay, I focus on attempts to clarify the biological level at which sets of genetic variants predominantly impact on illness. While it is indeed likely that genes act at multiple levels, that complexity is largely ignored here as are the levels of effects from environmental risk factors or from key mediating mental processes.). Consider four hypothetical levels: (i) biochemical, (ii) cellular, (iii) neuronal network and (iv) brain circuit. Genes act at a biochemical level. It will be easier to find simple and direct networks of genes containing common or rare variants or knocked out by pathogenic CNVs if the etiology of psychiatric disorders is biochemical (Figure 1a) . If the pathophysiology of psychiatric illness arises through cellular processessuch as synaptic functioning-the pathways from genes will be more complex and interactive (Figure 1b) . Detecting a clear network from GWAS and/or sequencing data would likely be more challenging. If the etiology of psychiatric disorders arises within small neuronal networks, the pathways from genes to disorder will be further complicated with more intervening steps and possibilities for interaction (Figure 1c) . Detection of coherent gene sets will be more difficult. Finally, what if psychiatric disorders result from dysfunctions of complex higher order brain circuitry as postulated by Panksepp and Biven 58 ? For example, he suggests that major depression arises from a disordered 'Grief' system comprising the anterior cingulate, dorsomedial thalamus, periaqueductal gray, ancient parts of the cerebellum and probably the ventral septal area, dorsal preoptic area and bed nucleus of the stria terminalis and all the inter-connecting fiber pathways. 58 It might then be very difficult to 'see' coherent gene networks because of the numerous intervening steps and interactions that occur between gene function and casual effects (Figure 1d) .
Think of it as the focus on a microscope. If the etiology of illness is in the same focal plane as our method (here GWAS and/or sequencing), we can likely see crisp etiological pathways emerge. But what if psychiatric illnesses arise at a cellular, network or circuit levels? Then our image will become increasingly out of focus. The biological coherence will be harder and harder to see and, at some point, might disappear altogether.
POSSIBLE PATTERNS OF FINDINGS
With this background, I outline four possible scenarios of GWAS and/or sequencing results (meant to be illustrative and not comprehensive), which differ in the degree of biological coherence that emerges. To reiterate, by coherence, I mean the genes whose altered expression or structure is indexed by the detected common or rare genetic variants or CNVs tell a sensible biological story. One of the main ways that they will do that is by forming networks of connected risk genes whose function is disrupted by sequence changes or CNVs. While the technical details are outside my purview, the connectivity of genes can be defined in several ways, including (i) being in the same metabolic pathway, (ii) acting at different stages in a biological system (for example, a neurotransmission system that would include synthetic and degradative enzymes, receptors and second messengers), (iii) having coordinated expression in developmental time, particular tissues and/or in response to specific stressors and (iv) shown to physically interact with each other.
I first describe the 'book-ends' of scenarios 1 and 4 that represent the two extremes. Then, I shall sketch out two possible outcomes in between as scenarios 2 and 3. Scenario 1-no coherence As depicted in Figure 2a , where Â s, circles and triangles reflect, respectively, risk genes with common variants, rare variants and those knocked out (or duplicated) by CNVs, this scenario predicts that as the number of confidently identified risk genes increases for psychiatric disorders, efforts to integrate these genes into a coherent picture of the underlying biology of the disorder will fail. What we will find will be a 'mess' lacking even 'islands' of connectivity reflecting subsets of variants working together to influence disease risk. Such an outcome could arise as a result of what philosophers have called the problem of 'multiple realizability. ' At a biochemical level, there are lots of ways to make a neuron hypofunction. For example, it could have under-developed dendrites, too few or dysfunctional receptors, downregulated secondmessenger systems or deficient transport mechanisms. There are even more biochemical pathways to make a complex neural circuit dysfunction that involves hundreds of thousands of neurons and many different cell types with a complex developmental history. This scenario is similar to the one depicted in Figure 1d .
Box 1 provides two philosophical approaches to the extreme heterogeneity that may exist for psychiatric disorders at a biochemical level. The first, by Fodor, 59 exemplifies the problems of multiple realizability. The second, by Mackie, 60 outlines an approach to causes that is highly contextual, being neither necessary nor sufficient.
Scenario 1 would be likely if we had, for psychiatric illness, hundreds of distinct biochemical changes that individually contributed to illness (while being neither necessary nor sufficient) with independent pathways to the phenotype. Perhaps there are too many ways for the human brain to produce the symptoms and signs of psychiatric disorders (for example, sad mood, auditory hallucinations, grandiosity) for us to have any chance for biologically coherent pathways to emerge from the hundreds or thousands of risk variants that make small contributions to risk. This concern is reinforced by studies showing that when large sets of gene knockouts are screened in the mouse, 20% of them impact on a single measure of behavior: the open field test for 'anxiety'. 61 In the first 93 widely available gene knock-outs strains in mice, 60% of them altered alcohol self-administration. 62 Could psychiatric disorders arise at such a high level within the mindbrain system that we have no way to integrate GWAS or sequencing findings? If so, then a genetic mess is a plausible outcome.
This story reillustrates the point made above. We cannot assume that anything that is 'heritable' will be biologically coherent. Complex behavioral traits may exist that are heritable in FTA studies and for which we would find polygene signals from GWAS (and perhaps sequencing) and some true positive individual variants when our samples get big enough. But these projects will not disclose any coherent biological pathways because discrete biochemical or neural systems that impact on these traits do not exist. The individual small effects scattered throughout the genome tell no meaningful biological story. The philosophical point here would be that genes are the 'wrong level' for trying to understand the biological mechanisms that cause such a trait.
Scenario 4-high coherence
In this most optimistic scenario, depicted in Figure 2d , most or all of the verified risk genes identified through GWAS, sequencing and/or CNV analyses will map to a single coherent inter-connected biological pathway. This will occur only if the genetic underpinnings of the disorder reflect a high degree of etiological homogeneity. Put in another way, the individual genes would reflect a system with a high degree of equifinality-all pointing to a single disease process.
This could arise because psychiatric disorders are truly biochemical disorders as illustrated in Figure 1a . Or, they could result from disorders at a cellular or network level but in such a way as to make their biological connections easily detectable with our current methodology. That is, we might have a robust equifinal model in which we can detect multiple causal routes to a final higher level cause.
This result would be the gene network equivalent of discovering a Mendelian disorder. What makes a Mendelian disorder so potentially scientifically tractable is the ability to localize the Figure 1 . (a) The simple and direct relationship between three risk genes found to be significantly associated with a disease in a genome-wide association or sequencing study and the biochemical system that causes the disease. (b) The moderately direct relationship with a few intervening steps between three risk genes found to be significantly associated with a disease in a genome-wide association or sequencing study and the disruption in cellular function that causes the disease. (c) The indirect relationship with a number of intervening steps between three risk genes found to be significantly associated with a disease in a genome-wide association or sequencing study and the disruption in the neuronal network that causes the disease. (d) The very indirect relationship with many intervening steps between three risk genes found to be significantly associated with a disease in a genome-wide association or sequencing study and the disruption in the brain circuit that causes the disease.
biological abnormality to a single gene product. These results would reflect a broadly parallel process in a disease but happening at a higher biological level-that of a gene network.
Scenario 2-minimal coherence
Scenarios 1 and 4 define the extremes of possible GWAS and sequencing results for psychiatric disorders. Most likely, results will be somewhere in between. Scenario 2, depicted in Figure 2b , predicts that these analyses will reveal minimal coherence with small pockets of connectivity. The genes identified by GWAS, sequencing and CNV analyses would form modest-sized interrelated sets but with no meaningful connections between them. They would not connect up to reveal major pathways to illness.
This might emerge in two particularly plausible ways. First, the results would arise from an LLR-like syndrome. In a large case control study of the LLR syndrome, we will expect to find clusters of variants that underlie the three traits of being left-handed, having a long nose and having red hair. But these clusters won't cohere as there is no underlying LLR biology.
Some psychiatric disorders could be like the LLR syndrome-an arbitrary concatenation of etiologically distinct symptoms that happen to occur within the same individual. Recent twin structural modeling analyses of the individual DSM-IV criteria have consistently found evidence for more than one underlying dimension of genetic liability in four psychiatric disorders. [63] [64] [65] [66] Second, the psychiatric disorders might have no coherent biological center but have some independent sets of risk factors each of which are then influenced by moderately inter-connected genes. Consider the heritable trait of 'liking roller coasters' that might be influenced by three high-level traits: risk for nausea, hedonic effects of rapid acceleration changes and thrill-seeking. Each of these traits is in turn influenced by a moderately coherent set of genes. But, because roller coasters are a human-constructed In this figure, reflecting scenario 3 (moderate coherence), meaningful connections are observed between two large groups of genes but these networks are not inter-connected. (d) A schematic gene network analysis of risk genes found by replicated GWAS or sequencing to contain, for a given psychiatric disorder, common risk variants ( Â ), rare risk variants (o) and or genes knocked out or duplicated by a CNV (D). In these figures, reflecting scenario 4 (high coherence), meaningful connections are observed between nearly all the genes, which largely combined into a single large network.
Box 1
Fodor 59 makes a famous argument about multiple realizability using as an example the concept of 'money.' Fodor argues that there is no underlying physical essence of money. Rather, money is multiply realized in coins of many different metallic compounds, various kinds of paper bills, beads and electronic signals on a hard drive in your credit card account. These are all money but share no physical property or essence in common.To put this into a genetics context, let us imagine a GWAS-like effort to collect thousands of samples of money from all over the world and submit them to physical analysis, seeking to understand the fundamental physical essence of money. We will fail because money is not defined in physical terms. Increasing the grant budget and the sample size will not help.Another philosophical approach to multiple causation was taken by Mackie 60 and its application to psychiatric illness developed by Meehl. 86 Mackie 60 argued that there can be multiple packages of sufficient causes, in which each element in any given package is necessary, but only within that package. This is what he called an inus notion of cause, where inus is an acronym standing for 'an insufficient but necessary part of a condition that is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result' (Mackie 60 , page 245). From this perspective, psychiatric disorders would be seen as having many, many inus causes. situation, there is no comprehensible underlying biology. Or, the construct of loving roller coasters exists at such a high level within the mind-brain system that it is currently out of reach for our science. In large GWAS or sequencing studies of the love of roller coasters, we would see these three gene sets turn up. But they would not be connected, nor with our current methods, would they point us to a coherent biological cause for love of roller coasters. Model 2 can illustrate the implausibility of Fodor's model for psychiatric illness. Consider the phenotype of loving roller coasters that we know from twin studies is moderately heritable. So, with big enough sample sizes, we will detect some variants in individual genes that have a phenotypic impact. But we have strong reason to believe, from basic biology, that the pathway from A to phenotype must involve other genes. Surely A will have a biochemical neighbor whose function, if altered by a genetic variant, would also contribute to the phenotype. Thus, it is possible that we might disclose only many, many little bundles of related genes as predicted by scenario 2, but not the complete mess predicted by Fodor's money model in which no gene is related to any other (scenario 1, Box 1). Scenario 3-moderate coherence As seen in Figure 2c , this scenario predicts that our bioinformatic analysis of the risk genes detected in GWAS, CNV and sequencing analyses would reveal a number of pockets of biological coherence that would reflect relatively discrete and substantial pathways contributing to disease risk. But they would not connect up into one grand pathway.
The most likely way in which this pattern could arise is classical biochemical genetic heterogeneity. There might be several independent genetically influenced pathways to our major psychiatric syndromes. Each of these pathways would produce 'clouds' of associated variants but they will not link up. Perhaps these pathways produce syndromes with subtly different clinical features but efforts to extract subtypes have failed because of too much noise between the genetic and phenotypic levels.
A slightly different scenario is possible. Imagine that the disorder arises from dysfunction at a high-level thalamo-cortical circuit that is contributed to by abnormalities in any one of multiple neuronal cell types with distinct neurotransmitter systems and key glial support cells. These genetic systems 'interact' but their interaction occurs so many steps away from the pathogenic genes that the interaction is muted and highly variable across individuals because of stochastic developmental process and variable environmental exposures. Some connectivity between these pathways is there, but it is patchy and unstable enough to be statistically unreliable.
Alternative metaphors for these four scenarios of GWAS findings for psychiatric illness In Figure 2a -d and (more indirectly) Figure 1a -d, I have tried to convey diagrammatically four possible scenarios for outcomes of GWAS, CNV and sequencing analysis for psychiatric disorders. In Box 2 and Box 3, I take a more intuitive/metaphorical approach to this same problem that might aid some readers.
EXAMPLES FROM OTHER COMPLEX DISORDERS
Our speculations about outcomes of GWAS signals from psychiatric disorders can be informed by reviewing what has been found for other complex disorders. 67 
Box 2
Imagine that one key mind-brain circuit (for example, the 'grief' system) is like a glass. The glass is constructed from many cells, under partial genetic guidance, wiring themselves over development, while responding to environment perturbations. Genes plus experience construct the needed set of nested feedback loops. Imagine that the total strength of the glassthe resilience of the system-reflects an emergent property of many, many genes acting together that constructs a glass that is either stress sensitive or resistant. (This might reflect the strong 'polygene' background signal we see in GWAS of most psychiatric disorders). Further imagine that we have a machine to deliver a precise hammer-blow (aka a critical life stressor) to the glass such that a set percentage of them break (aka develop illness). We will focus on those that break. Scenario 1 would arise when each glass that breaks shatters in its own unique way. Hardly ever would two individuals 'break down' along the same fault lines. Recalling that because each part of the glass would be structured by sets of genes working over development, this will produce a 'mess' in a large-scale GWAS. If this were true, we would have a very hard time getting a single reliable set of genes, variants that relate to disease risk, because of the high degree of multiple realizability. There are just too many different ways for the glass to break. Scenario 4 would occur if, in all humans, the glass developed with one deep notch in it-one weak point constructed by a small coordinated gene network. Each time the glass was struck, if it broke, it would (nearly) always break along the notch. In this case, our large-scale GWAS and sequencing studies would get a consistent strong signal from those sets of genes which knitted the glass around the notch-that represented the 'weak link' in the system. Scenarios 2 and 3 would reflect intermediate models. In scenario 2, there might be a few, moderately stable small notches over parts of the glass. However, most of the glass would shatter in a random manner. In scenario 3, there would be a modest number of possible notches with some people being weak at none, some with one and some more than one. This would produce sufficient acrossindividual consistency in a large sample study to detect the gene networks responsible for the various notches with some reproducibility.
Box 3
Imagine you are a senior mechanic undergoing final testing on a Boeing 747 jet airliner. Your job is to 'diagnose' the problems with the plane. You can assess the functioning of every part on the plane but you only know that the pilot complained that 'the plane was not flying well.' A 747 has six million parts, about the number of common SNPs in the human genome (http://www.boeing.com/commercial/ 747family/pf/pf_facts.html). In scenario 1, you find that after your detailed screen uncovers 50 broken parts, these parts all come from entirely different systems of the aircraft. You cannot see any pattern. The broken parts do not all contain the same kind of components, come from the same supplier or originate from the same kind of system. You are stumped. In scenario 4, you review the 50 broken parts. Although some reflect electrical and other mechanical parts of the plane, it becomes immediately clear that although spread out over several areas of the plane and reflecting different subsystems, all of them have an important role in one system in the airplane-the functioning of the wing flaps. Scenarios 2 and 3 would reflect intermediate models. In scenario 3, you might find that after much searching, that 40 of the 50 broken parts come from three rather distinct systems in the airplane that do not seemed linked together. In scenario 2, you might find four small groups of broken parts-3 to 5 parts each-that reflect individual sub-systems. But most of the parts seem random and cannot be meaningfully linked together in any useful way.
Type 2 diabetes
In a recent large-scale genomic analysis, 68 the authors ask whether 'as the number of (identified) susceptibility loci increases, there is evidence that the pathophysiological mechanisms y coalesce around a limited set of core pathways and networks.' They answer 'Our data suggest that this may be the case,' and point to three major disease mechanisms for type 2 diabetes emerging from their analysis: cell-cycle regulation, adipocytokine signaling and transcription related to the co-activator protein CREBBP.
Crohn's disease Searching across gene categories identified from GWAS, Holmans et al. 69 found significant enrichment of 30 gene categories, many related to the major histocompatibility locus, immune response and antigen processing. An analysis of individual variants identified in Crohn's shows many to be involved in autophagy and innate immunity. 70 An examination of GWAS data for Crohn's disease found a highly significant concentration of genetic variants in 20 genes from the IL12/IL23 pathway. 71 Parkinson's disease Both Mendelian forms and the recent variants detected from large-scale GWAS of sporadic cases may point to a single, complex, pathophysiological pathway involving oxidative stress and mitochondrial dysfunction that predispose to death of critical dopamine neurons. 72 Multiple sclerosis Of the total of 57 confirmed risk variants from GWAS, 'the majority of associated genes have immune-related functions y especially cell-mediated immunity' (Baranzini and Nickles 73 , page 240).
Alzheimer's disease Three Mendelian genes have been identified for the early onset form and considerable evidence suggests that these three genes all impact on the synthesis and/or degradation of amyloid b-protein (Ab). 74 Bertram and Tanzi conclude that six common risk variants for Alzheimer's disease can now be considered established, with all but one (APOE) having been discovered by GWAS. 74 They write 'y nearly all of the newly reported loci have been proposed to be linked to Ab metabolism in one or more ways. These metabolic effects include Ab aggregation and clearance y (and) effects on the immune response to Ab-related toxicity (page 90).' Height An analysis of 180 markers significantly associated with height in a GWAS of over 130 000 revealed a range of detectable patterns. 75 Variants in or close to genes involved in abnormal skeletal growth were highly over-represented. Using both text-mining and geneset enrichment analyses, these variants were more closely clustered together than expected by chance. GWAS variants for height were also highly significantly concentrated in genes expressed in the mammalian growth plate, a structure critical to bone elongation. 76 However, these disorders may be more genetically tractable than psychiatric illnesses. Psychiatric disorders may be more heterogeneous than other complex disorders, most of which have at least partially understood pathophysiologies. Psychiatric disorders remain historical-clinical syndromes of unknown etiology. Furthermore, the mind-brain system is considerably more complex genetically than other tissues. Brain gene expression changes dramatically over development, and a much higher proportion of the human genome is expressed in the brain than in other tissues. 77 The greater genetic complexity of brain-based phenotypes is also suggested by evidence from mouse knock-out lines that find the percentage of knockouts which influence a single behavioral test (open field) is twice as great as those influencing classical traits such as plasma cholesterol and blood urea nitrogen, and four times as many as influence blood glucose or hemoglobin levels. 61 The greater complexity of the mind-brain system may instantiate highly emergent traits that are more remote from individual gene effects than those seen in other tissues.
We also ought to briefly consider what hints are available from gene network analyses of psychiatric disorders. These are sketchy because the number of replicated variants yet published is so small and the methods so new and uncertain that risk of false positive findings is high. For example, in the PGC GWAS analysis of schizophrenia, five of the seven genome-wide significant findings were potentially related to micro-RNA 137). 32 Jia et al. 78 utilized an integrative analysis of multiple GWAS data sets in which they overlaid association signals onto a protein-protein interaction database. These identified potential risk genes, which they replicated in an independent sample and then submitted to network analyses. Ten potential pathways were identified that were enriched for known neuronal-relevant functions, including CREB and calcium signaling, and synaptic long-term depression. Using convergent functional genomics applied to GWAS data for schizophrenia as well as human and rodent gene expression data bases, Ayalew et al. 79 identified another set of potential pathways, including cell-adhesion, myelin-related, glutamate receptor and G-coupled receptor signaling. O'Dushlaine et al. 80 used a molecular pathway analysis applied to nominally significant variants in GWAS data from schizophrenia and found evidence for a cell adhesion molecular pathway. In an analysis of GWAS data from bipolar illness, Holmans et al. 69 found over-representation of variants in a variety of gene ontology pathways, in particular those reflecting hormonal activity, RNA splicing and macroautophagy. Meta-analyses of GWAS data from autism reported that many of the identified variants were in genes involved in transcriptional regulation, specifically chromatin-related proteins active during brain development 81 and from major depression supports the etiological role of glutamatergic transmission. 82 Pathway analysis applied to GWAS data from schizophrenia, bipolar illness, major depression, autism spectrum disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder suggested a cross-disorder etiological role for calcium channel signaling variants. 83 Network and pathway analyses are proceeding in psychiatry and may reveal coherent biological processes contributing to our illnesses but the evidence is limited to date.
Finally, other tools are emerging that might provide insight into disease pathways from GWAS data. For example, Maurano et al. 84 showed selective enrichment of GWAS disease-associated variants within DNA hypersensitivity sites of specific cell types. Enriched signals were seen from immune cells for both Crohn's disease and multiple sclerosis. We can also now examine spatiotemporal correlations in gene expression in the human brain 77, 85 as yet another way to understand how diverse genes might work together in the development and function of neural systems.
COMMENT ON THE FOUR SCENARIOS FOR GWAS AND SEQUENCING RESULTS
In the context of these findings, what useful can be said about our four scenarios for the outcome of GWAS and sequencing findings from psychiatric disorders? These scenarios have very different implications for the underlying nature of our major psychiatric disorders and the availability of targets for drug development. Although advocated by Turkheimer 43 in a thoughtful essay, I consider scenario 1 to be improbable. Although psychiatric disorders are likely etiological heterogeneous, and some of the coherence may be emergent at levels in the mind-brain system too high for us to now study, the chances that no meaningfully connectivity between variants will emerge seems low. Scenario 4 is also improbable. As insights into the etiology of our psychiatric syndromes have, over their history, been so difficult to come by, it seems unlikely that risk genes for these conditions would display a high level of coherence at a network level. A scenario 4 outcome would be a boon for drug development, as it should yield a rich harvest of potentially drugable targets that might prove to have broad efficacy. My guess is that results will point to the space occupied by hypotheses 2 and 3, and the shades of gray in between. Of course, different psychiatric disorders might fall at different places along this continuum. Furthermore, as science advances, our ability to detect coherence will improve and may move us, for particular disorders, from lower to higher numbered scenarios.
CONCLUSION
Psychiatric genetics has taught us a great deal about the nature of psychiatric disorders but provided painful lessons. We know that familial and genetic factors make an important contribution to the etiology of nearly all psychiatric disorders. Yet, despite our wishing so, individual gene variants of large effect appear to have a small to non-existent role in the etiology of major psychiatric disorders. We have clarified the role of genetic factors in comorbidity, elucidated development pathways and documented the importance of gene-environment correlation and interaction but our valued candidate genes produced quite limited insights into the nature of genetic risk for illness. While important in a number of ways, our heritability estimates provide no insight into underlying biological process and no guarantee that the syndrome is biologically coherent.
With more mature molecular and statistical methods, we are entering a new era now. Statistical tools applied to aggregate genetic variants from GWAS have shown that prior estimates of heritability from FTA studies could not have resulted from flaws in their methodology. Most excitingly, replicated GWAS signals, which we expect to increase substantially in coming years, have the potential, along with CNVs, to provide insights into the underlying biology of our disorders, their level of heterogeneity, and their biological coherence. We even have a chance to perceive, 'through a glass darkly,' the levels of the mind-brain system that are disordered in our syndromes.
What should we expect to see? The most pessimistic prediction that we will observe only a mess is unlikely. But discovering a highly coherent single pathway to illness also seems improbable. We can hope that the heterogeneity is not too great and the real level of illness not too hidden in the upper reaches of the mindbrain system. If this is true, important insights into the nature of psychiatric illness are likely to await our efforts.
